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Higher unemployment is an inevitable consequence
of the financial crisis. According to OECD projec-
tions, unemployment for the OECD countries will
on average rise from less than 6 percent in 2007 to
9 percent in 2010. Higher unemployment is a direct
cost of the financial crisis, and there is a widespread
fear that the increase in unemployment may become
persistent.The experience from the 1970s and 1980s
with high and persistent unemployment stands out
as a worst case scenario with large social costs and
severe consequences for the already much strained
public finances. Accordingly, how to minimize the
risk of persistent high unemployment is an impor-
tant policy question.
Many countries have resorted to an active demand
management policy as a response to the crisis, and
this has undoubtedly helped mitigate the conse-
quences of the crisis.It has also been argued that an
aggressive demand management policy may even
pay off in the medium to long run by reducing per-
sistence in unemployment. The
argument being that by reduc-
ing the impact effect of the cri-
sis on unemployment, fewer
will risk becoming long-term
unemployed. While this argu-
ment has some weight, one
must be realistic about the
potential of fiscal policy in this
respect.This is so due to labour
market dynamics and hetero-
geneity, where two dimensions
are particularly important.
First, the sectors adversely
affected by the crisis (building
sector, financial sector, export
sector) are not necessarily those which would ben-
efit from a more expansionary policy increasing
public and/or private demand.Hence,the perceived
effect of fiscal stimulus on aggregate demand may
underestimate the implied need for labour restruc-
turing and adjustments. In short, the areas experi-
encing job creation are not necessarily the same as
those suffering from crisis induced job destruction.
The second reason is that labour dynamics imply
that increasing unemployment is an unbalanced
event tending in particular to affect the young, the
old, the less skilled, immigrants and other marginal
groups in the labour market.
In sum, aggregate demand management policies are
effective in mitigating some of the consequences of
the financial crisis, but it is neither a guarantee
against persistence in unemployment, nor necessari-
ly well-targeted in counteracting persistence.
Persistence in the labour market
It is well-established empirically that labour mar-
kets display substantial inertia in the sense that
(un)employment is highly persistent.Figure 1 illus-
trates this by reporting a metric for the persistence
in the employment rate for OECD countries. The












































































































































































































Source: Own calculation based on data from www.sourceoecd.org.
PERSISTENCE IN CYCLCAL EMPLOYMENT CHANGES
OECD countries
Note: The figure reports the correlation in the cyclical component of employment rates found by HP filtering 
the employment rate for the age group 15–64. For most countries the data period is 1975–2008. For a few 
countries the period is marginally shorter due to data availability.
Figure 1ployment rate, because the measured unemploy-
ment rate is affected not only by changes in em-
ployment but also by changes in labour supply
tending to move pro-cyclically. Hence, a more reli-
able measure of the state of the labour market is
the employment rate. This variable also better
summarizes the implication of the labour market
stance for public finances. Although there is some
variation across countries,the figure shows that the
persistence in the employment rate is high in most
OECD countries.
Such simple historic measures should be interpreted
with some care.They do not clearly separate the role
of shocks and their persistence from the persistence
generating mechanisms arising from sluggish adjust-
ment of various forms. Moreover, the adjustment
path and thus persistence depend on institutional
settings and policy reactions which may shorten or
prolong the adjustment.
While unemployment persistence may arise for vari-
ous reasons, it becomes particularly important when
it reflects that unemployment is concentrated on a
specific group, the long-term unemployed. In itself
this has social costs,and it also implies that the effec-
tive labour supply is reduced in a medium-term per-
spective due to human capital depreciation.The lat-
ter, in turn, makes it difficult to bring employment
back to its initial level and thus reinforces persis-
tence.Prolonged unemployment may imply a depre-
ciation of human capital along various dimensions
including work experience, self-esteem, social capi-
tal, networks etc.
Losing the young or dropping the old?
These concerns are supported by the fact that a num-
ber of countries have experienced a steep increase in
youth unemployment and there is fear that genera-
tions will be lost.At the same time,increasing unem-
ployment among older workers is in itself a problem,
which moreover may challenge the agenda in most
countries to increase retirement ages as a remedy to
counteract the effects of ageing. The fact that youth
unemployment is particularly sensitive to the busi-
ness cycle is often taken as an indication that persis-
tent youth unemployment is the major risk. How-
ever, it is not clear that one can infer from cyclical
variability to the risk of persistence, as is seen by
considering the labour market performance of
young and old.
The typical labour market history has the employ-
ment rate at first increasing and then decreasing with
age, i.e., an inverted U-curve – see Figure 2a. The
persistence hypothesis can be summarized as fol-
lows:if a cohort for some reason is exposed to a neg-
ative or positive shock, then this will tend to affect
the labour market history of this cohort for several
years,and possibly its remaining labour market hori-
zon. This is illustrated in Figure 2b by the dotted
lines indicating two such profiles:a young generation
happening to enter the labour market in a very
favourable period which permanently results in a
higher employment rate at all ages,or – in contrast –
another generation entering in a period with low
employment and later suffering from lower employ-
ment rates. Clearly, such shocks may arise at differ-
ent ages for different cohorts.Figures 2c and 2d look
at this issue separately for the young (age 15 to 34)
and the old (age 40 to 64): the separation is made as
the data availability provides few complete labour
market histories. Figure 2c thus addresses whether
the young become a ‘loosing’ or ‘winning’ generation
depending on whether they enter the labour market
during a boom or recession.Similarly,Figure 2d con-
siders how the old fare in the labour market.
Figures 2c and 2d provide the data for Sweden, but
the pattern is similar for most countries for which
data is available. For the young there is an unclear
pattern; some generations start out with a low
employment rate relative to other cohorts, but end
up with a relatively high employment rate. Obverse-
ly, some cohorts starting out with a relatively high
employment rate end up with a relatively low em-
ployment rate.In short,there is no clear pattern sug-
gesting strong persistence in employment across
cohorts in the younger ages. For elderly individuals
there is a clearer picture in accordance with the per-
sistence hypothesis. Cohorts having a relatively low
(high) employment rate in the midst of their labour
market career also tend to have a low (high) employ-
ment rate for their remaining labour market history.
Persistence in employment for elderly workers is
resolved when they retire. Hence, shocks affecting
the middle-aged will typically produce persistent
effects on the overall employment rate for a period
of 15 to 20 years.
Figure 3 illustrates the correlation in cohort specific
employment rates at various ages. The correlation
indicates how employment of the age group 30–34
depends on employment of the age group (20–24)
and how the employment of the old (60–64) depends
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on employment as middle aged (45–49). In the case
of the young there is no clear evidence of persis-
tence, and in many cases the effect is wrongly
signed.1 The employment rate for the young seems
to depend more on the current business cycle situa-
tion than their earlier employment rate. For the old,
in most cases, there is a much clearer indication of
persistence implying that a low employment rate as
middle aged tends to lead to a low employment rate
for the remaining labour market history.
Thus, there seems to be a particular risk that a deep
recession may permanently reduce employment
rates for older workers, whereas it is less clear
whether youth unemployment will produce ‘losing’
generations.Either persistence is more important for
the old or policies have been more active or success-
ful towards the young. There are various possible
explanations for these facts. The implications of
human capital depreciation may be more important
for elderly workers since knowl-
edge and experience accumulat-
ed through a long work career
may become suddenly obsolete.
Moreover, a shorter remaining
labour market horizon may have
adverse effects on both the
demand and the supply side of
the market in relation to
employment. The employment
path for elderly individuals is
also affected by various path-
ways out of the labour market
such as early retirement and dis-
ability pensions. In contrast,
there has been more political
willingness to pursue more ac-
tive policies towards the young-
er age groups.
The role of labour market 
policy
It is a primary purpose of labour
market policies to address the
problem of persistence and long-
term unemployment.As a conse-
quence of the crisis, the policy
orientation therefore has to
change from focussing on reduc-
ing the stock of long-term unemployed and margin-
alized to minimizing the inflow into long-term unem-
ployment. The evidence above shows that it is par-
ticularly important to avoid that middle-aged work-
ers become marginalized.
The clearest policy lesson from the 1970s and 1980s
is that reductions of labour supply (e.g. early retire-
ment schemes) were not successful in solving the
underlying problems, but had large long-term costs
since the schemes have been politically difficult to
reverse. This lesson seems to have been learned,
since few new passive measures allowing easier exit
from the labour market have been introduced in
response to the financial crisis.However,some of the
existing pathways out of the labour force via early
retirement, disability pensions and the like may be
further used as a response to the increasing unem-
ployment problem.
As a first response to the increase in unemployment,
some countries – beyond aggregate demand mea-
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EMPLOYMENT PERSISTANCE ACROSS COHORTS IN SWEDEN
YOUNG AND OLD
Employment rates for a given cohort in a given age
Source: Own calculations based on data from www.sourceoecd.org
(a)  Age dependent employment rates
for cohort being 15–19 in 1963
%
Note: The data is for 5-year age groups which are used to form average histories for 
5-year cohorts. Data is available from 1960 to 2008 (in some cases only a shorter 
sample is available). 
(b)  Hysteresis hypothesis
%
(c)  Cohort specific employment rates 
the young




1 Note that this focuses entirely on employment rates,but there can
be other scarring effects of youth unemployment, see Bell and
Blanchflower (2010).ance schemes and the social safety net to ensure
income protection for those adversely affected by
the crisis.There is not necessarily a problem in offer-
ing better insurance in a difficult situation with a
high unemployment rate. This has direct welfare
effects, and the implied distortions are likely to be
smaller in a situation with high unemployment. The
critical aspect is to ensure that such changes are tem-
porary. This can be achieved by linking the proper-
ties of the unemployment insurance benefit (UIB)
scheme more explicitly to the state of the labour
market.This is known from the United States where
the benefit duration depends on the unemployment
rate. An even more sophisticated scheme is applied
in Canada where benefit eligibil-
ity, benefit levels and duration
depend on the labour market
situation. Theoretically, it may
be argued that such a scheme
may strike a better balance
between insurance and incen-
tives by providing more insur-
ance when the need is largest
(high unemployment periods)
and strengthening incentives
when the distortions are poten-
tially largest (low unemploy-
ment periods) – see Andersen
and Svarer (2009).
It is sometimes argued that
schemes offering better insur-
ance are bound to cause more
persistence due to a weakening
of incentives. The latter arises
from the fact that needed adjust-
ments or changes in reservation
demands are delayed. Hence,
there is allegedly a trade-off
between cushioning the effects
of the shocks and their persis-
tence. Whether this is the case
obviously depends on various
dimensions of the safety net (e.g.
duration of unemployment ben-
efits) and policies aiming at
strengthening job search and
employment including active
labour market policies. It is an
open question whether there is
empirical support for the view
that a generous social safety net
strengthens persistence. Based
on summary statistics as given in
Figure 1, there is no evidence of such a relation.
Obversely, it is clear that persistent unemployment
has significant effects on public finances in a system
with a generous tax-financed social safety net.
Active labour market policies
The main reason for the changed labour market sit-
uation is a fall in aggregate demand and thus labour
demand.Therefore an obvious short-term remedy is
measures aiming at increasing labour demand.
However, as argued above, the risk of long-term
unemployment is not necessarily well-targeted by
































































































CORRELATION IN EMPLOYMENT RATES 
'YOUNG - MIDDLE AGED' AND 'MIDDLE AGED - OLD'
IN SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES  %
Figure 3
Notes: The figure shows the correlation between the employment rate at the age 35–40 and the employ-
ment rate at the age 20–24 across cohorts, and similarly for the old between the employment rate at the
age 60–65 and the employment rate at the age 45–50. The cohorts are constructed using data for employ-
ment rates at 5 year age intervals from 1960 to 2008, and hence few complete labour market histories can
be constructed. For some counties the correlation refers to different age groups due to lack of data.











0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Source: Own calculation based on data from www.sourceoecd.org.
SOCIAL EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE
Note: The figure reports the coefficient from the estimation reported in Figure 1, social expenditures as a 
share of GDP.
y = 0.0125x + 0.3959
R
2 = 0.273
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aggregate demand measures,and more specific mea-
sures may be more appropriate. One such instru-
ment is a wage subsidy targeting particular groups
like long-term unemployed, immigrants etc. Work
sharing arrangements are also a useful instrument
for sharing jobs over a short period of time, since it
permits a larger pool of workers to remain in job.
This will keep a larger group in contact with regular
jobs for which it is hard to think of equally efficient
active labour market policies.A more unequal shar-
ing increases the risk of long-term unemployment
for the affected. Clearly, it is important for such
schemes to be temporary so as not to impede struc-
tural changes.
To reconcile insurance with incentives, and hence to
counteract persistence, active labour market policies
play a crucial role. An increase in unemployment
raises a number of issues for active labour market
policies.The direct effect is that an increase in unem-
ployment causes a volume increase for given rules
with respect to the timing and type of activation pro-
grammes. This means a larger inflow into pro-
grammes. Moreover, the composition of the pool of
unemployed people changes. In recent years with
falling unemployment, the focus shifted towards
integrating more marginalized groups in the labour
market,but the increase in unemployment will bring
more core workers into active labour market pro-
grammes.
Active labour market programmes serve various
purposes including incentives, matching and qualifi-
cations.In the current situation when unemployment
increases due to falling demand,the main problem is
not to maintain incentives for job search. For many
groups affected by unemployment there is a strong
economic incentive to search for jobs. Moreover,
matching problems cannot be argued to be the main
problem. Hence, both of these factors imply that
there can be a huge deadweight cost of early inter-
vention applied to the increasing number of unem-
ployed. Politically, there may be strong pressure to
focus on such schemes to signal that problems in the
labour market are taken seriously, but it is question-
able whether this is a sensible strategy. Although
unemployment increases and affects many, it does
not imply that all of them are on the verge of becom-
ing marginalized.Despite increasing unemployment,
there are still substantial dynamics in the labour
market, and many are affected only by a short spell
of unemployment. For example, in Denmark 40 per-
cent of those who became unemployed in early 2009
have found a job within 13 weeks, which underlines
the risk that early intervention may cause huge
deadweight costs.
The key task of active labour market programmes is
to ensure that an unemployment spell does not turn
into long-term unemployment.The crucial difficulty
is to identify those in the risk group. In some cases
this may depend on individual characteristics, e.g.
lack of qualifications,but in other cases it is more dif-
ficult to predict who will be affected. The crisis is
associated with large structural shifts, and this
implies that labour has to be reallocated and thus
possibly re-trained, and although such macro
changes can be identified, it is not necessarily clear
which individuals will be adversely affected. An
increase in unemployment thus raises a sorting prob-
lem of how to target groups with a high risk of long-
term unemployment. Some useful criteria can be
found by combining education, previous experience,
and age. Profiling may be one way to address this
problem.
Retraining of various forms may be required for
many unemployed. For the young the focus should
be on entry into the ordinary educational system.
For older workers there may be a need for retrain-
ing to overcome structural changes and facilitate
job finding. Standard arguments against such pro-
grammes are that they imply lock-in and have mod-
erate effects on later labour market performance.
While there are good reasons to be sceptical about
very general across-the-board training programmes
for all unemployed, there is also a good case to be
made that re-training is required in many cases.
Moreover, the cost of lock-in is clearly smaller in a
high unemployment period.Recent Swedish experi-
ence indicates more positive effects which may be
attributed to the fact that the programmes have
been well targeted to job relevant education (see
De Luna et. al. 2008).
One way to balance these considerations may be to
design active labour market policies so that intensive
intervention starts when unemployment duration
passes some time threshold and to focus on main-
taining contact with the labour market.Since private
job training has been found to be the most effective
in bringing the unemployed into regular work, there
is a case for focussing more on this,but also for mak-
ing workers more willing to accept short-term jobs.
The latter can be implemented by changing theemployment criteria for remaining eligible for
unemployment insurance benefits.
A recession raises a number of risks for active labour
market policies. This includes increasing cost and
overload, but also questioning the efficiency of such
programmes.The latter may raise a political risk that
it becomes difficult to maintain support for such
policies when unemployment is increasing. How-
ever, in this debate is it important to take into
account that the likely alternative to active labour
market policies is an exit from the labour market,
and this is an irreversible decision with large costs.A
first priority of labour market policy is to ensure that
the current crisis does not translate into a shrinking
labour force.
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